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Songwriters v. Spotify: Is Spotify the
Problem or a Symptom of the Problem?
Abstract
Today, streaming is the prevailing mode of music consumption. Yet,
streaming services are struggling to turn a profit, as songwriters also face
significant financial challenges in the streaming era. All the while, record
labels are collecting the majority of streaming revenue and seeing record
profits.
The 2018 Music Modernization Act attempted to address songwriters’
and streaming services’ financial problems by altering the factors considered
by the Copyright Royalty Board in determining the mechanical royalty rates
owed by streaming platforms to songwriters. A proper application of this
newly instated factor test necessitates considering both songwriters’ and
streaming services’ business operations and finances. However, during the
2018–2022 mechanical rate determinations, the majority court largely
disregarded the financial interests of streaming services in determining the
new mechanical rate. As a result, in February 2019, the Copyright Royalty
Board raised the rate of mechanical royalties paid by streaming services to
songwriters by an unprecedented 44%.
This article demonstrates that Spotify’s pending appeal of the new
mechanical rate is predicated on legitimate and reasonable concerns
regarding the Board’s application of the law. Additionally, the article
analyzes both songwriters’ and Spotify’s positions and, in addressing them,
proposes two alternative solutions to the 44% mechanical rate increase.1

1. Since the authorship of this article, in August 2020, the DC Circuit partly vacated and
remanded the Copyright Royalty Board’s 2018-2022 Mechanical Rate Determination, finding that the
Board “failed to give adequate notice or to sufficiently explain critical aspects of its decisionmaking.”
See Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Board, No. 19-1028, at 4 (D.C. Cir. 2020),
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/720464D843B0D6C7852585C10074B11B/$fil
e/19-1028-1856124.pdf. The DC Circuit cited three primary reasons for vacating the Copyright
Board’s mechanical rate determination: (1) for “fail[ing] to provide adequate notice of the rate
structure it adopted,” (2) for “fail[ing] to explain its rejection of a past settlement agreement as a
benchmark for rates going forward,” and (3) for failing to “identif[y] the source of its asserted authority
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to substantively redefine a material term after publishing its Initial Determination.” Id. While this
article does not address points (1) and (3), it does discuss several of the concerns raised by the DC
Circuit under point (2), particularly the fact that the Board’s new, unprecedented formula for
determining the 2018-2022 mechanical rates was predicated on the fallacious assumption that, in
response to a 44% increase in songwriters’ mechanical royalty rates, record labels would “naturally”
decrease the cost of their sound recording royalties out of good will and to “‘ensure[] the continued
survival and growth of the music streaming industry.’” Id. at 15. This article further discusses and
analyzes this concern, to which the Board must respond in its remand proceedings. The Board’s
remand proceedings are expected to run “at least into the second half of 2021.” See Announcement
Concerning Interim Mechanical Royalty Rates Pending the Outcome of Copyright Royalty Board
Remand Proceedings in Phonorecords III, MLC (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.themlc.com/press/
announcement-concerning-interim-mechanical-royalty-rates-pending-outcome-copyright-royalty.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Songwriters and Spotify are at war.2 In February of 2019, the Copyright
Royalty Board raised the rate of royalties paid by streaming services to
songwriters (“Songwriters”)3 by an unprecedented 44%.4 Within weeks,
Spotify announced its intent to appeal the rate increase.5 In response,
Songwriters, including Justin Tranter (who wrote Justin Bieber’s “Sorry” and
Selena Gomez’s “Bad Liar”) and Ross Golan (who wrote Ariana Grande’s
“Dangerous Woman” and Flo Rida’s “My House”), declared war.6 In a letter
addressed to Spotify and disseminated across social media, these and other
Songwriters called out: “You have used us and tried to divide us but we stand
together. . . . Our fight is for all songwriters. . . . WE all create the ONE thing
you sell. . . . Do the right thing and drop your appeal of the Copyright Royalty
Board rate determination.”7
From the sound of the Songwriters’ war cry, it seems like Spotify’s appeal
is yet another familiar tale of corporate greed—but is it?8 This Comment
addresses this question by analyzing Spotify’s position in the appeal and

2. Chris Leo Palermino, Is Spotify Suing Songwriters? The Latest Legal Battle, Explained,
VULTURE (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.vulture.com/2019/03/spotify-songwriters-battle-explained.
html.
3. See Copyright Owners: Written Direct Statements Vol. I–IX, No. 16-CRB-0003-PR (2018–
2022) [hereinafter Statements of Copyright Owners]. Throughout this Comment, the term
“Songwriters” shall reference all songwriters and music publishers on whose behalf the parties, inter
alia, National Music Publishers Association and Harry Fox Agency LLC, are participating in the
Copyright Royalty Board’s 2018–2022 Mechanical Rate Determinations. See Joint Petition to
Participate of National Music Publishers Ass’n, Harry Fox Agency LLC, Nashville Songwriters Ass’n
International, Church Music Publishers Ass’n, Songwriters of North America at 1, No. 16-CRB-0003PR (2018−2022) (Copyright Royalty Board Feb. 3, 2016).
4. See Palermino, supra note 2.
5. You Might Have Heard About the Streaming Industry’s CRB Appeal—Here’s What You Need
to Know, SPOTIFY FOR ARTISTS: NEWS (Mar. 11, 2019), https://artists.spotify.com/blog/you-mighthave-heard-about-the-streaming-industry%27s-crb-appeal-here%27s-what [hereinafter SPOTIFY
ARTISTS NEWS]; see also Jem Aswad, Hit Songwriters Slam Spotify’s Attempt to Lower Royalties:
‘You Have Used Us’, VARIETY (Apr. 9, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://variety.com/2019/biz/news/spotifysecret-genius-songwriters-lower-royalties-1203184870/; Elias Leight, Threats, Bullying and
Misinformation: Inside Spotify’s Battle with Songwriters, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 19, 2019, 12:15 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/threats-bullying-misinformation-spotify-battlesongwriters-820969/.
6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7. Aswad, supra note 5.
8. See, e.g., id. (publishing the Songwriters’ “war cry” letter and listing notable supporting
Songwriters).
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explaining how Spotify’s position is predicated not on greed, but on legitimate
business concerns.9 Rather than persecuting Spotify, this Comment seeks to
address the problem underlying both Songwriters’ and Spotify’s issues on
appeal—present-day digital music copyright law.10
To begin, Part II of this Comment briefly recounts the history and
evolution of music copyright and royalty payments.11 Part III explains the
current state of digital music copyright law and the Copyright Royalty Board’s
2018 mechanical rate determination.12 Part IV analyzes both Songwriters’
and Spotify’s arguments on appeal, explains why Spotify’s argument is
particularly compelling in light of current copyright law, and proposes an
alternative to the Copyright Royalty Board’s 2018–2022 Rate increase and an
amendment to music copyright law that solves both Songwriters’ and
Spotify’s problems.13 Finally, Part V concludes.14
II. MUSIC COPYRIGHT LAW: FROM PLAYER PIANOS TO STREAMING
Since its enactment in 1790, Congress has regularly amended the
Copyright Act in response to advances in technology.15 However, today
Congress has yet to properly address copyright law as it pertains to streaming
technology.16 To understand why Songwriters and Spotify are particularly
disenfranchised in the streaming era, one must familiarize oneself with the
evolution and context of present-day music copyright law.17

9. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing Spotify’s position and business concerns).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part II (recounting the history of music copyright law, from piano sheet music to
digital music).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. Kaitlin Chandler, The Times They Are a Changin’: The Music Modernization Act and the
Future of Music Copyright Law, 21 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 53, 55 (2019).
16. Mary LaFrance, Music Modernization and the Labyrinth of Streaming, 2 BUS.,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 310, 311 (2018). Rather than address the nuances of streaming
technology, Congress has repurposed “laws that were designed for piano rolls and vinyl records.” Id.
17. See id.; see also infra Part III (explaining music copyright law in the streaming era).
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A. Early Music Copyright: 1787–1831
In 1787, the Constitution imparted to Congress the power “to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”18 Shortly thereafter, Congress exercised this power by enacting
the Copyright Act of 1790, which protected solely “the authors of any maps,
charts, book or books.”19 Notably, the Act left songwriters to fend for
themselves.20
Nearly fifty years passed before Congress, in 1831, extended copyright
protection to “musical compositions.”21 For the first time, authors and owners
of “musical compositions” were granted the exclusive right to the “printing,
reprinting, publishing and vending” of their works.22 However, because the
Act failed to define the term “musical composition,” it left songwriters
uncertain of the scope of their protection.23 This ambiguity persisted for threequarters of a century.24
B. The Copyright Act of 1909: Mechanical Licensing and Performance
Licensing
In 1909, Congress finally amended the Copyright Act to define the term
“musical composition” and clarify for songwriters the full scope of their
copyright protection.25 The Act stated that a “musical composition” was to be
any “arrangement,” “setting of,” “notation,” or “form of recording” music.26
The Act further stipulated that copyright protection extended to all “musical
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 1
(1978)).
20. See id.
21. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 2 Stat. 436 (1831).
22. See id.; see also Chandler, supra note 15, at 55–56.
23. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976). Today, the
term “musical composition” encompasses any combination of “music (melody, rhythm, and/or
harmony expressed in a system of musical notation) and accompanying words.” U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, CIRCULAR 56A, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS: MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND
RECORDINGS (2019) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS].
24. See generally infra Part II.B.1 (describing Congress’s first attempt to clarify the scope of the
term “musical works”).
25. Chandler, supra note 15, at 56; see also Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(b), (e).
26. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e).
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works,”27 which the Act defined as both musical compositions and the
“mechanical reproduction” of such compositions.28 The Act narrowly defined
“mechanical reproductions” as the manufactured parts, such as piano rolls,29
that are used in “music-producing machines.”30
1. Compulsory Mechanical Licensing
Thereby, the Copyright Right Act of 1909 created the “mechanical
license.”31 As a result, those seeking to mechanically reproduce a copyrighted
song must first acquire the license to do so from its copyright owner.32 In the
wake of the 1909 Act, mechanical licenses became particularly vital to player
piano companies,33 which required a mechanical license for every piano roll
manufactured and sold.34 Consequently, Congress feared that player piano
companies would purchase the exclusive mechanical rights to every popular
song, thereby precluding others from reproducing popular music.35 Thus, in
27. See generally id. at § 1. The Copyright Act of 1909 coined the term “musical works” to
reference the collective body of musical compositions eligible for copyright protection. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Piano Roll, OXFORD LEARNER’S DICTIONARIES, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.
com/definition/english/piano-roll (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). A piano roll is “a roll of paper full of
very small holes that controls the movement of the keys in a player piano.” Id. A player piano is “a
piano that plays itself by means of a piano roll.” See Player Piano, OXFORD LEARNER’S
DICTIONARIES, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/player-piano (last
visited Jan. 14, 2021).
30. Copyright Act of 1909 § 25(e). Thus, the Act expressly extended copyright protection to the
mechanical reproduction of songs onto piano rolls (and any other form of mechanical reproduction,
e.g., the process of creating phonorecords). Statement of Marybeth Peters: The Register of Copyrights
Before the Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Statement of Marybeth Peters 2004].
31. Statement of Marybeth Peters 2004, supra note 30; see also Mechanical License, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanical_license (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (defining a “mechanical
license” as a license granted by “the holder of a [musical work] copyright” that grants a licensee the
right to “reproduce[] or sample a portion of the original composition”).
32. See Statement of Marybeth Peters 2004, supra note 30.
33. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1907) superseded by
statute, Copyright Act of 1909. Prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, in White-Smith,
musical works’ copyright owners sought to enforce their mechanical rights against Apollo Co., a
popular piano roll and player piano manufacturer. See id. at 8−9. However, because Congress had
yet to define mechanical rights, the Court ruled in favor of Apollo Co. Id. at 18.
35. See Sarah Jeong, A $1.6 Billion Dollar Spotify Lawsuit is Based on a Law Made for Player
Pianos, VERGE (May 14, 2018, 12:28 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/14/17117160/spotifymechanical-license-copyright-wixen-explainer; DANA A. SCHERER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43984,

791

[Vol. 48: 785, 2021]

Songwriters v. Spotify
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

a preventive effort, Congress “tempered the newly granted mechanical right”
by appending to it a compulsory licensing provision, rather than granting it an
exclusive right.36 Meaning, if a copyright owner granted one player piano
company the right to mechanically reproduce her song onto piano rolls, the
copyright owner would then be compelled to grant that mechanical right to
anyone else seeking to mechanically reproduce her song, so long as the
licensee paid two cents per “each such part manufactured.”37 Today,
mechanical rights continue to bear this compulsory component.
2. Performance Licensing and Consent Decrees
In addition to mechanical rights, the Copyright Act of 1909 granted
copyright owners the exclusive right to any “public performance” of their
musical works.38 A “public performance” is “any music played outside a
normal circle of friends and family.”39 As opposed to mechanical licenses,
which are required solely when a song is mechanically (i.e., physically)
reproduced, performance licenses must be sought nearly every time a
copyrighted song is played publicly.40
Keeping track of public performances and personally enforcing
“performance rights” posed logistical challenges for songwriters.41
Consequently, “copyright owners banded together to create Performance
Rights Organizations (PROs), which offer blanket licenses42 and collect
MONEY FOR SOMETHING: MUSIC LICENSING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (2018).
36. Jeffrey A. Wakolbinger, Compositions Are Being Sold for a Song: Proposed Legislation and
New Licensing Opportunities Demonstrate the Unfairness of Compulsory Licensing to Owners of
Musical Compositions, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 805 (2008); see also Chandler, supra note 15, at 56;
Statement of Marybeth Peters 2004, supra note 30.
37. Copyright Act of 1909 ch. 320, § 1(a), (e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); see also Statement of Marybeth
Peters 2004, supra note 30. See generally Compulsory License, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Compulsory_license (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
38. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e).
39. Sam Kronenberg, Royalty Rates and Exclusive Releases Threaten Music Streaming, 27 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L. J. 633, 635 (2018). A “public performance” includes a song played at a restaurant, a
musical venue, or on the radio. See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 16, at 337.
40. Joy Butler, Music Licensing: The Difference Between Public Performance and
Synchronization Licenses, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR. (May 16, 2017), http://www.copyright.com/
blog/music-licensing-public-performance-license-synchronization/.
41. Kronenberg, supra note 39, at 636.
42. See Frequently Asked Questions: Blanket License, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/searchresults?q=blanket%20license (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (defining a “blanket license” as “a license
which allows the music user to perform any or all of the millions of works in the [PRO’s] repertory,
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royalties on behalf of the composers.”43 Soon, two PROs were managing the
majority of performance rights in the United States: the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI).44
In 1941, the Department of Justice (DOJ) challenged ASCAP’s and
BMI’s business practices and eventually charged them for violating the
antitrust laws by engaging in price-fixing.45 As a result, the DOJ subjected
ASCAP and BMI to consent decrees,46 which continue to compel ASCAP and
BMI to “offer non-exclusive blanket licenses . . . for a mutually agreeable flat
fee or share of revenue.”47 Furthermore, the consent decrees stipulated that,
in the event ASCAP or BMI fail to reach an agreement with a potential
licensee, a federal judge will be designated to set the price and terms of the
parties’ blanket license agreement.48 Thereafter, the DOJ assigned ASCAP
and BMI each a judge from the Southern District of New York to hear and
decide such disagreements.49

as much or as little as they like”).
43. Kronenberg, supra note 39, at 636. While a performance license grants a licensee the right to
perform a single song, a blanket license grants a licensee the unlimited right to perform every song in
a PRO’s respective catalog. See, e.g., Blanket License, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/searchresults?q=blanket%20license (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
44. See Randi B. Rosenblatt, CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 445, 446 (1978).
45. See id. (“[T]he Department of Justice, concerned with ASCAP’s ‘overwhelming position in
the entertainment field[,]’ brought an antitrust action against ASCAP.”); Glen Manishin, Don’t Revoke
the Music Licensing Antitrust Decrees, LAW360 (June 12, 2018, 12:49 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1052629/don-t-revoke-the-music-licensing-antitrust-decrees
(explaining that when an oligopoly like BMI and ASCAP exists, i.e., when two monopolists share an
entire market, the concern is that they will agree to set high prices rather than compete and set prices
that correspond with consumers’ demands). See generally Antitrust Consent Decree Review—ASCAP
and BMI 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-consent-decree-reviewascap-and-bmi-2019 (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (explaining the DOJ’s review of Consent Decrees).
46. See Consent Decree, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consent_decree (last visited
Jan. 14, 2021) (defining a “consent decree” as “an agreement” that “resolves a dispute between two
parties” and requires the court to maintain supervision over it “to ensure that businesses and industries
adhere to” it).
47. Kronenberg, supra note 39, at 636.
48. Id.
49. Congress Steps into How Radio’s ASCAP and BMI Rates Are Set., INSIDERADIO
(Dec. 22, 2017), http://www.insideradio.com/free/congress-steps-into-how-radio-s-ascap-bmi-ratesare/article_06af4ecc-e6e6-11e7-96d7-0bce5532dfb4.html.
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3. The Copyright Act of 1909’s Mechanical Flaws
In spite of its virtues, the Act’s extended protection quickly proved
inadequate against developments in music technology.50 For the purposes of
this Comment, only two of these deficiencies will be addressed. First, the
Act’s stringent language failed to include “sound recordings” within its
protective scope.51 As a result, copyright owners struggled to enforce their
mechanical rights against music piracy.52 Second, the Act imposed
compulsory rates on copyright owners’ mechanical rights.53 As a result, it
undermined copyright owners’ bargaining power by forcing them to license
reproductions of their songs at a uniform price, often disproportionate to their
fair market values.54 Although Congress has yet to properly address these
problems today, Congress’s first attempts to amend them took place in the

50. See Chandler, supra note 15, at 56. Throughout the following sixty-eight years, Congress
noted that the Act of 1909 was “based on the printing press as the prime disseminator of information.”
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, NO. 1979 0-281-C93/2815, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF
1976 1:1 (1977). Since its enactment, “[s]ignificant changes in technology[] resulted in a wide range
of new communications techniques,” such as “radio, television, communications satellites, cable
television, computers, photocopying machines, [and] videotape recorders.” Id. “This growth in
technology made revision of the Act of 1909 imperative.” Id.
51. See Chandler, supra note 15, at 56. “Sound recordings” are a series of sounds fixed onto
physical formats, called “phonorecords.” See COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS, supra note 23.
Phonorecords include tapes, LPs, CDs, and mp3s. Id.
52. See Statement of Marybeth Peters 2004, supra note 30; GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT
ACT OF 1976, supra note 50, at 2:2. “Music piracy” is the unauthorized or unlicensed duplication of
a copyrighted song’s sound recording, and the unauthorized and unlicensed fixing of that duplicated
sound recording to a phonorecord. Ernest S. Meyers, Sound Recordings and the Copyright Act, 22
N.Y.U. L. REV. 573, 574–75 (1977).
53. See Statement of Marybeth Peters: The Register of Copyrights Before the Subcomm. on Intell.
Prop., Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Statement of Marybeth Peters 2005],
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat071205.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (noting that the Act’s
“ceiling rate” of two cents for each mechanically reproduced composition remained in effect for sixtyeight years, regardless of external market factors).
54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. With time, Congress wondered “whether it would
further benefit the industry as a whole simply to repeal, yet not replace, the [mechanical] compulsory
license. Then reproduction and distribution rights would truly be left to marketplace negotiations.”
Statement of Marybeth Peters 2005, supra note 53. In 2005, Marybeth Peters, the 11th U.S. Register
of Copyrights, opined: “In principle, I favor this approach [i.e., repealing the compulsory mechanical
rate]. After all, the Constitution speaks of authors’ ‘exclusive rights to their Writings,’ and in general
authors should be free to determine whether, under what conditions and at what price they will license
the use of their works.” Id. See generally infra Parts II.D.2., III.A (addressing further developments
in compulsory mechanical rates).
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1970s.55
C. The Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 and the Copyright Act of
1976: Creating the Sound Recording Copyright (a Second Music
Copyright)
Finally, Congress implemented some protection for “sound recordings”
through the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 and the Copyright Act of
1976.56 But rather than extend the protection to songwriters and their
copyrighted musical works, Congress established a second kind of music
copyright—the “sound recording copyright.”57 Thus, Congress only extended
sound recording protection to sound recording copyright owners—not
songwriters.58 Only when a songwriter and performing artist are the same
person does the Act provide both copyrights, and thus sound recording
copyright protection.59
Appreciating the distinctions between a song’s musical work copyright
and its sound recording copyright is pivotal to understanding contemporary
problems in music licensing.60 These two separate copyrights (of a single
song) have vastly different rights available to their owners.61 For example,
sound recording copyright protection is limited exclusively to the use of
derivative sound recordings; that is, sound recordings that “directly or
indirectly recapture[] the actual sounds fixed in [copyrighted sound]

55. See infra Part II.C (analyzing Congress’ first effort).
56. See generally GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, supra note 50. Both pieces
of legislation protected against the unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted sound recordings. See
Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92–140, §§ 1, 101, 85 Stat. 391 (1970) (current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (1978)); Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–553, §§ 101–810, 90 Stat. 2541
(1978) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (1978)).
57. See Daniel S. Hess, The Waiting Is the Hardest Part: The Music Modernization Act’s Attempt
to Fix Music Licensing, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 187, 189 (2019). Typically, the songwriter
who “composes a song retains [the] copyright in that written composition while the record company,
and occasionally a recording artist with significant bargaining power, [] owns the copyright in the
[sound] recording that is promoted and sold.” Id.
58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
59. Hess, supra note 57, at 189–90. Conversely, when two performing artists record separate
covers of the same song—for example Frank Sinatra and Nat King Cole both recorded their own
renditions of Fly Me to the Moon—both artists can acquire separate sound recording copyright
protection. Id.
60. Id. at 190.
61. Id.; see also Chandler, supra note 15, at 57.
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recording[s].”62 Thus, Congress did not extend the scope of sound recording
copyright protection to public performances, because public performances do
not involve “recaptur[ing] fixed sound.”63 Congress only provided protection
of public performances to the musical work copyright.64 A second distinction
between the sound recording copyright and the musical work copyright is the
disparity between their respective freedoms to bargain: while Congress
permitted sound recording copyright owners to set their own licensing rates,
Congress left musical work copyright owners bound by both the performance
licensing consent decrees and compulsory mechanical licenses.65 Thus, rather
than alleviate some of the deficiencies produced by the 1909 Act, the
Copyright Act of 1976 exacerbated them.66
D. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
In 1995, Congress again amended the Copyright Act in response to new,
popular technologies altering music consumption: the internet and digital
downloads.67 The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995 (DPRA), however, didn’t alleviate songwriters’ problems; it perpetuated
them.68
1. Digital Performance Licensing for the Sound Recording Copyright
First, the DPRA granted sound recording copyright owners a newfound
performance right—the “digital performance right.”69 Unlike the preexisting
performance right, the digital performance right was limited to interactive

62. Kronenberg, supra note 39, at 635.
63. Id. Notably, “[t]he public performance right was explicitly excluded from the 1971 Sound
Recording Act because of lobbying on behalf of large radio broadcasters,” who claimed “that sound
recordings played over terrestrial radio should be exempt from copyright due to the promotional
benefits artists and record labels receive from radio plays.” Id. at 635−36.
64. Id.; see also Hess, supra note 57, at 190.
65. See supra notes 49, 54 and accompanying text.
66. See supra Part II.B.3 (summarizing the Copyright Act of 1909’s deficiencies).
67. See Kronenberg, supra note 39, at 633–34.
68. See infra Part II.D.1–2. See generally Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995 § 2, 17 U.S.C. § 106, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-104publ39/pdf/PLAW104publ39.pdf.
69. Chandler, supra note 15, at 57; see also Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
of 1995 §§ 2, 3, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-104publ39/pdf/PLAW-104publ39.pdf.
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digital streaming services (Interactives) and excluded non-interactive
streaming services (Non-Interactives).70 The DPRA classified streaming
services that “allow listeners to choose the recordings they hear” or “enable
users to predict which songs are most likely to be played” as Interactives;71 in
contrast, the DPRA classified streaming services that do not permit listener
participation as Non-Interactives.72
As a result of the DPRA, anytime an Interactive includes a song on its
services, it must obtain two separate performance licenses: (1) a digital
performance license from the song’s sound recording copyright owner, and
(2) a performance license from the song’s musical work copyright owner.73
Because the DOJ only imposed consent decrees on the musical work
copyright, sound recording copyright owners remain free to negotiate the rates
and terms of their performances licenses.74 Consequently, sound recording
copyright owners generally bargain for and receive significantly higher
performance royalties than do musical work copyright owners.75
2. Digital Mechanical Licensing for the Musical Work Copyright
Second, the DPRA established the “digital mechanical right”—an
important victory for songwriters.76 Prior to its passage, the musical work
copyright’s mechanical right extended only to the mechanical reproduction of
songs (e.g., CDs, cassette tapes, and vinyl records).77 With the DPRA, the
musical work copyright gained a “mechanical right” to the digital
reproduction of songs as “digital phonorecord deliveries” or “digital
70. LaFrance, supra note 16, at 314.
71. Id. (classifying Pandora, Apple Music, and Spotify as Interactives).
72. Id. (classifying Sirius XM, iHeart Radio, and Pandora Free as Non-Interactives).
73. See id. Congress held interactive streaming services “to this more demanding standard because
they are more likely to displace sales of physical records and digital downloads.” Id. In comparison,
when a song is performed by a non-digital entity (such as terrestrial radio), that entity is still only
required to obtain a performance right from the song’s musical work copyright owner. Kronenberg,
supra note 39, at 636; see also Hess, supra note 57, at 190.
74. See Kronenberg, supra note 39, at 635; LaFrance, supra note 16, at 314.
75. LaFrance, supra note 16, at 315, 317. The consent decrees that the DOJ imposed on the
musical work copyright’s performance rights in the 1940s remain active today. Id.
76. See generally Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 § 4, 17 U.S.C.
§ 115.
77. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), (e) 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976)
(extending protection for the composition copyright to the process of mechanically reproducing it onto
any physical form).

797

[Vol. 48: 785, 2021]

Songwriters v. Spotify
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

downloads,” such as those purchasable on iTunes.78 The DPRA also
established the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB),79 a three-judge panel
responsible for adjusting the royalty rate of digital mechanical rights every
five years pursuant to a “reasonable rate” standard.80 Though the DPRA, like
its predecessors, precluded musical work copyright owners (i.e., songwriters)
from freely negotiating their mechanical rates, it at least ensured that such
rates would not be left frozen in decades past.81
After the DPRA’s enactment, however, Interactives found it challenging
to adhere to the DPRA’s digital mechanical licensing scheme.82
Consequently, while record labels made record profits, songwriters received
fractions of the pay their copyrights merited.83 The DPRA’s newly
established scheme obliged record labels to obtain a mechanical license from
a song’s musical work copyright owner prior to making and distributing that
song as a digital download.84 Then, because of the compulsory nature of
78. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995 § 4. The DPRA uses “digital
phonorecord deliveries” in lieu of “digital downloads.” Id.
79. “The CRB is the administrative body responsible for establishing statutory rates and terms
under the section 115 license, a process that by statute takes place every five years. . . . [It’s] made up
of three judges appointed by the Librarian of Congress.” Chandler, supra note 15, at 64–65; see also
COPYRIGHT AND THE MARKETPLACE, infra note 79.
[E]ach [CRB] judge must have a law degree and at least seven years’ legal experience. In
addition, one judge must have significant knowledge of copyright law, one must have
significant knowledge of economics, and one must have a minimum of five years’ judicial
or quasi-judicial experience. [Presently t]he board of Judges consists of Judge Jesse M.
Feder (chief judge), Judge David R. Strickler (economics), and Judge Steve Ruwe
(copyright). Judge Feder’s current term ends in January 2024; Judge Strickler’s current
term ends in January 2022; and Judge Ruwe’s current term ends in December 2025.
About Us, U.S. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BD., https://www.crb.gov/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
80. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 29 (2015),
http://www.copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf.
The “reasonable rate” standard consisted of four, vague factors: (1) maximizing availability of creative
works to the public; (2) affording copyright owners a fair return and licensees a fair income; (3)
reflecting the relative roles of the copyright owner and licensee in making the product publicly
available; and (4) minimizing disruptive impacts on the industries involved and on generally prevailing
industry practices. Id. In the years following the DPRA’s passage, the CRB’s “reasonable rate”
standard would prove to be too elusive. See Music Modernization Act, 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2018)
(substituting the “reasonable rate” standard).
81. Cf. Statement of Marybeth Peters 2005, supra note 53. Prior to the DPRA’s passage, the
mechanical rate had remained at “two cents for each such part manufactured” since 1909. Id.; see also
Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(a), (e).
82. LaFrance, supra note 16, at 315.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 314.
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mechanical licenses,85 record labels were empowered to license a song’s
digital download to Interactives and Non-interactives alike without seeking
further approval from that song’s songwriter (i.e., musical work copyright
owner)—provided that the subsequent licensees filed a notice of intent with
the Copyright Office and paid the compulsory mechanical rate.86 Interactives
alone were responsible for performing these last steps: locating and paying
the compulsory mechanical rates warranted by the thousands of songwriters
whose songs they had acquired from record labels.87 However, Interactives
didn’t pay songwriters their outstanding mechanical rates because they found
tracking and identifying them costly and difficult.88 And, because the DPRA
failed to define the term “digital phonorecord deliveries,” some Interactives
disputed whether the Act even intended to govern “streaming,” or simply
“digital downloads.”89 These Interactives then exploited this ambiguity to
evade paying songwriters any of the mechanical royalties owed to them from
streaming.90
III. “MODERN” MUSIC COPYRIGHT LAW: THE MUSIC MODERNIZATION ACT
By 2018, interactive streaming had replaced digital downloads as the
preferred means of music consumption, making up 75% of the music
industry’s revenue.91 Accordingly, clarifying the DPRA’s ambiguous digital
phonorecord deliveries term and ensuring that Interactives pay Songwriters
fairly and uniformly for their rights became vital for the songwriting

85. See Statement of Marybeth Peters 2014, supra note 30. Mechanical licenses are compulsory
because, when Congress first created them in 1909, they feared piano players would otherwise
monopolize the industry. See supra Part II.B.1. Thus, anytime a composition’s mechanical right is
licensed, prospective licensees are automatically authorized to license it as well, so long as they pay
the compulsory mechanical rate. See Compulsory License, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Compulsory_license (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
86. LaFrance, supra note 16, at 314.
87. Id. at 315–16.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 314. Interactives argue that digital phonorecord deliveries only encompassed digital
downloads and excluded streaming. Id.
90. Chandler, supra note 15, at 58; see also LaFrance, supra note 16, at 316.
91. RIAA 2018 Year-End Music Industry Revenue Report, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/RIAA-2018-Year-End-Music-Industry-Revenue-Report.pdf (last visited
Jan. 14, 2021) (noting that in 2018 streaming made up 75% of the music industry’s revenue, while
digital downloads made up only 11%).
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community.92 For this reason, Congress enacted the Orrin G. Hatch-BobGoodlatte Music Modernization Act (MMA).93
A. Mechanical Licensing for Interactive Streaming
The MMA clarified some of the ambiguities in its 1995 predecessor.94
First, it stated that Interactives must obtain mechanical licenses.95 Second, the
MMA stipulated certain procedures—particular to Interactives—which
Interactives must observe to obtain mechanical licenses.96 Third, the MMA
re-emphasized that mechanical licenses are only available if a song’s sound
recording was originally made “with express consent” of its Songwriter(s).97
Most importantly,98 fourth, the MMA dictated to the CRB a new standard
for determining the royalty rate for mechanical licenses—the “willing
buyer/willing seller.”99 Now, rather than apply the DPRA’s complex
“reasonable rate” factors,100 the MMA instructs the CRB to apply new
“willing buyer/willing seller” factors.101 These new factors “require the

92. See supra Part II.D.2 (summarizing the DPRA’s shortcomings).
93. See generally
Music Modernization
Act, 17
U.S.C.
§ 115
(2018),
https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/mma_conference_report.pdf; see also LaFrance, supra note 16,
at 321.
94. See generally Music Modernization Act § 115.
95. Id. at § 115(b)(1). Specifically, the MMA stated that all digital platforms “other than digital
phonorecord deliveries,” must obtain mechanical licenses. Id. The grouping, “other than digital
phonorecord deliveries,” includes Interactives. LaFrance, supra note 16, at 322.
96. Music Modernization Act § 115(b)(1) The MMA “authorizes the copyright owners of musical
works to form a nonprofit mechanical licensing collective that will (1) issue blanket mechanical
licenses to digital music services, (2) collect those mechanical royalties, and (3) distribute the royalties
to the copyright owners.” Id. As was aforementioned, prior to the MMA, if an Interactive could not
identify a song’s musical work copyright owner, that Interactive would typically just not payout the
outstanding mechanical royalties. Id. “To remedy this, the MWMA requires . . . [Interactives] to
serve notice on the mechanical licensing collective.” Id. “Therefore, even if the streaming service
cannot identify the copyright owner(s) or determine their respective royalty shares, it must still pay
the mechanical royalty to the licensing collective,” and “the collective itself will undertake the task of
identifying the copyright owners.” Id.
97. See Music Modernization Act § 115(a)(2).
98. See infra Part IV (for the purposes of the comment, the “willing buyer/willing seller” standard
is the most important MMA provision).
99. See Music Modernization Act § 115(c)(1)(F).
100. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (defining the “reasonable rate” standard).
101. See Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords
(Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 1918, 1955 (Feb. 5, 2019) [hereinafter 2018–2022 Rate
Determinations] (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 385). These four “willing buyer/willing seller” factors
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[CRB] Judges to exercise ‘legislative discretion’” to make “independent
policy determinations that balance the interests of [Songwriters] and
[Interactives].”102 In other words, the willing buyer/willing seller factors
supposedly produce mechanical rates that reflect songs’ “fair market value.”103
Notably, recent applications of the willing buyer/willing seller standard have
resulted in unprecedentedly high royalty rates for songwriters.104
B. Performance Licensing for Interactive Streaming
To ensure that “more economically accurate” fees were paid to
Songwriters, the MMA also changed the rules governing the Southern District
of New York’s (“rate courts’”) oversight of performance blanket licenses.105
First, the MMA permitted the rate court to consider the terms and rates
negotiated between Interactives and record labels for sound recordings’ digital
performance rights.106 “[This] was intended to prevent the sound recording
considered by the CRB are (1) “maximizing the availability of creative works” (maximizing
availability); (2) “affording copyright user fair income and copyright owner a fair return” (fair
income); (3) “reflecting the relative roles of copyright owners and copyright users with respect to
creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the
opening of new markets for creative expression” (relative roles); and (4) “minimizing disruptive
improvements on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry
practices” (minimizing disruption). Id.; see also Music Modernization Act § 801(b)(1) (instructing
the CRB on how to determine the royalty rate).
102. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1955.
103. See Chandler, supra note 15, at 66; see also James Chen, Fair Market Value, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fairmarketvalue.asp (last updated Sept. 29, 2020) (“In its
simplest sense, fair market value (FMV) is the price that an asset would sell for on the open market. . . .
[A]n asset’s fair market value should represent an accurate valuation of or assessment of its worth.”).
104. See Chandler, supra note 15, at 65–66. In 2019, this resulted in the CRB’s 44% rate increase
of mechanical royalties. Chris Robley, 44% increase in mechanical royalty rates for streams in the
USA, DIY MUSICIAN (Jan. 29, 2018), https://diymusician.cdbaby.com/news/44-increasemechanical-royalty-rates-usa/. See generally infra Part III.C (discussing the CRB’s projected rate
increase). This 44% rate increase is what spurred Spotify’s appeal. See generally supra Part I
(discussing Spotify’s rate increase appeal). Spotify, along with other Interactives, argues whether such
rates are in fact reflective of their copyrights’ fair market value. See generally infra Part IV (analyzing
Spotify’s argument that the new mechanical rates do not reflect the musical work copyright’s fair
market value).
105. Hess, supra note 57, at 196–97; see also LaFrance, supra note 16, at 324–25.
106. See Music Modernization Act § 114 (f)(1)(B)(ii). Recall, there are no consent decrees imposed
upon sound recordings’ digital performance rights; thus, record labels are free “to negotiate for market
rates.” LaFrance, supra note 16, at 324. See generally supra Part II.D.I (discussing the DPRA). For
example, Spotify has individually negotiated blanket sound recording performance licenses with the
three biggest record labels: Universal, Sony, and Warner Music Group. Hess, supra note 57, at 193.
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[digital] performance royalties from having a depressing effect on the
[Songwriters’ musical works] performance royalties.”107 Additionally, rather
than assign a single judge to oversee all licensing disputes concerning a
particular PRO, the MMA instituted a rotating system.108 This “wheel
approach” was intended to cure inconsistent rate determinations between the
different PROs, and likewise, increase the musical work copyright’s
performance royalty rates.109
C. The Music Modernization Act in Effect: The Copyright Royalty Board’s
2018–2022 Mechanical Royalty Rate Determinations
On January 27, 2018, soon after the MMA went into effect, Songwriters
got their first taste of victory.110 The Copyright Royalty Board announced its
mechanical rate determinations for the period of January 1, 2018 through
December 31, 2022.111 In a 2–1 vote, the CRB held that all mechanical
royalties paid to Songwriters would increase incrementally over the five year
period of 2018–2022—ultimately, mechanical royalties will equal 15.1% of
Interactives’ annual revenue (Percent of Revenue).112

107. LaFrance, supra note 16, at 324.
108. See Hess, supra note 57, at 196–97 (noting that the MMA repealed 17 U.S.C. § 114(i) (1978),
which assigned one judge per PRO).
109. Ed Christman, Music Modernization Act Introduced In the House of Representatives, With
Major Music Licensing Reform At Stake, BILLBOARD (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.billboard.
com/articles/business/8078543/music-modernization-act-house-of-representatives-licensing-reform
(“This wheel approach ensures that the judge will find the facts afresh for each rate case based on the
record in that particular case, without impressions derived from prior cases.”).
110. See generally 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101 (explaining the new mechanical
rate determinations).
111. Id.
112. Callie P. Borgmann, The Future of Streaming Music: The Music Modernization Act and New
Copyright Royalties Regulations, 21 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 20 (2018); Appeal Ruling on
Publisher Royalty Rate Hike Looks Like It Favors Digital Services Contentions: Sources, MIMICNEWS
(Aug. 8, 2020), https://mimicnews.com/appeal-ruling-on-publisher-royalty-rate-hike-looks-like-itfavors-digital-services-contentions-sources.
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1. A 2–1 Vote in Favor of a 44% Mechanical Royalty Rate Increase
for Songwriters
Previously, under the DPRA’s “reasonable rate” standard,113 Interactives
were only required to pay Songwriters approximately 10% of revenue in
mechanical licenses.114 This 44% rate increase is the largest in the history of
the CRB.115 In fact, should the total content cost (TCC)—i.e., the total cost of
payments made by Interactives to record labels for their sound recording
rights—exceed the new Percent of Revenue rates, the CRB set an alternative
payment rate.116 The following table reflects this “greater of” approach:
2018–2022 All-In Royalty Rates117
Year

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Percent of Revenue

11.4

12.3

13.3

14.2

15.1

Percent of TCC

22.0

23.1

24.1

25.2

26.2

Thus, should an Interactive’s Percent of Revenue exceed its TCC in 2022,
it must pay a musical work’s copyright owner approximately fifteen cents for
every dollar earned.118
To arrive at the newly determined rates, the CRB applied the MMA’s new
“willing buyer/willing seller” factors to “balance the interests of copyright
owners and users.”119 If the evidence (presented by Songwriters and
Interactives) had demonstrated that the current rates addressed these policy
considerations, the judges would have left the rates unadjusted.120 However,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See supra note 80 and accompanying text (defining the “reasonable rate” standard).
See Borgmann, supra note 112, at 19–20.
Robley, supra note 104.
2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1936.
Id. at 1918.
See id. at 1955.
Id.; see also text accompanying supra note 101.
See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1955. See generally Statements of
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because the judges found they did not, they “adjust[e]d the reasonable,
market-based rate appropriately.”121
2. Spotify Appeals
Soon after the CRB announced its Mechanical Royalty Rate
Determinations, Spotify announced its intent to appeal:
Music services, artists, songwriters and all other rightsholders share
the same revenue stream, and it’s natural for everyone to want a
bigger piece of that pie. But that cannot come at the expense of
continuing to grow the industry via streaming. The CRB judges set
the new publishing rates by assuming that record labels would react
by reducing their licensing rates, but their assumption is incorrect.122
Evidently, Spotify is taking a pro-competitive, pro-business position.123
Ironically, so are the Songwriters.124
IV. SONGWRITERS V. SPOTIFY: WHAT’S THE PROBLEM, AND HOW DO WE
SOLVE IT?
During the CRB’s 2018 mechanical royalty rate proceedings, Spotify
testified that it cannot afford to pay Songwriters a higher royalty rate,125
whereas Songwriters testified that they cannot afford to carry on songwriting
Copyright Owners, supra note 3; Introductory Memorandum to the Written Direct Statement of
Spotify USA Inc., No. 16-CRB-0003-PR at 1 (2018–2022) [hereinafter Statement of Spotify],
https://www.crb.gov/rate/16-CRB-0003-PR/statements/spotify/introductory-memorandum.pdf.
121. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1955.
122. SPOTIFY ARTISTS NEWS, supra note 5.
123. See id. See generally Statement of Spotify, supra note 120 (arguing that Spotify’s reasonable
business concerns and essential business practices weigh in favor of not increasing the mechanical
royalty rates).
124. See Harley Brown, Spotify’s Secret Genius Songwriters Pen Letter to Daniel Ek Over CRB
Rate Appeal: ‘You Have Used Us’, BILLBOARD (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/8506466/spotify-secret-genius-songwriters-letter-daniel-crb-rate-appeal. In a letter
to Spotify, the industry’s leading songwriters (e.g., Ali Tamposi and Bryan Lee, who wrote Camilla
Cabello’s “Havana,” and Evan Bogart, who wrote Rihanna’s “SOS”) accuse Spotify of precluding
them from having stable careers. Id. See generally Statements of Copyright Owners, supra note 3
(arguing that Songwriters’ reasonable financial concerns and the fact that their songs are essential to
Interactives’ business models weigh in favor of increasing the mechanical royalty rates).
125. See generally Statement of Spotify, supra note 120; infra Part IV.A.
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at the current rate.126
A. Spotify’s Problem: A Costly Business Model
To determine the appropriate mechanical royalty rate, Spotify proposed
to the CRB that it consider: (1) the essence of its business—“grow[ing] its
listener base, [to] thereby increase[] the exposure and dissemination of [songs]
to the public and decreas[e] piracy”—and (2) its costly operating expenses.127
Particularly, Spotify argued and presented expert testimony demonstrating
that an increase in the mechanical rate would inhibit its ability to make the
“substantial and necessary investments in technology, personnel, sales, and
marketing” to allow it to “continue providing the benefits and revenues it
brings to [S]ongwriters and the music industry.”128
At the heart of Spotify’s argument is the assertion that Spotify’s margins
(and growth) are at the mercy of music copyright owners.129 Spotify’s fixed
costs, such as software development and music licensing, are already costly.130
Furthermore, unlike other streaming platforms, Spotify has no complementary
businesses with which to deepen its pockets and offset its losses.131 Thus,
Spotify argued that maintaining or decreasing the current royalty rates is
necessary for ensuring “a fair income to Spotify,” “more money for copyright
owners,” and the “sustainab[ility]” of the music market.132

126. See generally Statements of Copyright Owners, supra note 3.
127. See generally Statement of Spotify, supra note 120, at 2.
128. Id. at 6.
129. Id. at 4 (demonstrating copyright owners’ control of rates).
130. Id. at 6.
131. See Michelle Castillo, As Spotify Prepares to Go Public, There’s No Obvious Solution to Its
Shaky Business Model, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:32 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/spotifyipo-business-model-flaws.html. Amazon Music and Apple Music, unlike Spotify, are complementary
businesses to much more profitable businesses, which offset their expenses and permit them to operate
at losses if necessary. Id.
132. Statement of Spotify, supra note 120, at 6–8.
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1. The Cost of Music Licensing
According to its 2018 F-1 SEC filing,133 Spotify reported annual revenue
of $4.09 billion.134 In fact, Spotify has only ever reported operating at a profit
twice since its launch in 2008135—and it’s not just Spotify that’s operating at
a loss.136 Interactive streaming services “remain famously unprofitable,” even
those belonging to the world’s leading companies, like Apple and Amazon.137
However, unlike these larger companies, Spotify is not using its streaming
service as a loss leader for generating sales of expensive complementary
hardware to its consumers.138 Thus, unlike these competitors wielding their
complementary businesses to keep themselves afloat, Spotify will not be able
to operate forever at a loss.139

133. See Adam Hayes, SEC Form F-1, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/secform-f-1.asp (explaining that a “Form F-1, which is also known as a Registration Statement, is a
requirement under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933) (last updated Jun. 9, 2020). The Securities
Exchange “[A]ct—often referred to as the ‘truth in securities’ law—requires that these forms,
providing essential facts, are filed to disclose important information upon registration of a company’s
securities.” Id; see also Securities & Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(B) (1934).
134. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018) [hereinafter
Registration Statement], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1639920/000119312518063434/
d494294df1.htm#rom494294_7; see also Statement of Spotify, supra note 120, at 8 (stating that
Spotify’s “losses are largely driven by high royalty costs that consume more than 70 cents of every
dollar that Spotify earns”). In 2018, the stats were no different—74% of Spotify’s annual revenue was
paid out to copyright owners. Dmitry Pastukhov, How Music Streaming Works and the Popular Music
Streaming Trends of Today, SOUNDCHARTS (June 13, 2019), https://soundcharts.com/blog/howmusic-streaming-works-trends.
135. See Tim Ingham, Spotify is Profitable. How Did That Happen?, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 12,
2019, 12:31 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/spotify-profitable-howhappen-910456/. In quarter three of 2019, Spotify reported an operating profit of $60.4 million, but
only a year-to-date operating profit of $4.5 million. Id. In quarter four of 2018, Spotify reported
operating at a $107 million profit, but a year-to-date operating profit of $1 million. See Spotify
Shareholder Letter for Q4 2018, SPOTIFY (Feb. 6, 2019), http://q4live.s22.clientfiles.s3-website-useast-1.amazonaws.com/540910603/files/doc_financials/quarterly/2018/q4/Shareholder-Letter-Q42018.pdf.; Company Info, SPOTIFY (Feb. 6, 2019), https://newsroom.spotify.com/company-info/ (last
visited Jan. 14, 2021) (explaining that Spotify was launched in 2008).
136. See infra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.
137. Murray Stassen, Spotify’s Market Cap Value Has Fallen By $15BN In 14 Months. Is Declining
ARPU Freaking Investors As Much As Record Companies?, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/spotifys-market-cap-value-has-fallen-by-15bn-in-14months-is-declining-arpu-freaking-investors-as-much-as-record-companies/.
138. See Castillo, supra note 131 (stating that Spotify’s main competitors, Apple Music and
Amazon Music, “can afford to operate music services forever without making a dime”).
139. See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text.
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Interactive streaming services share one major expense: copyright.140
“Music rights are expensive, and since there are only a few major record
labels, [Interactives have] limited negotiating power.”141 If an Interactive fails
to “cut a deal” with one of these record labels, it stands to lose up to a third of
its music libraries and, inevitably, its subscribers.142 In fact, under the “Risk
Factors” of its IPO filing, Spotify acknowledged this industry vulnerability:
[T]here is no guarantee that the licenses available to us now will
continue to be available in the future at rates and on terms that are
favorable or commercially reasonable or at all. The terms of these
licenses, including the royalty rates that we are required to pay
pursuant to them, may change as a result of changes in our bargaining
power, changes in the industry, changes in the law, or for other
reasons.143
To include a song on its platform, an Interactive must license three parts
of that song: (1) the musical work copyright’s mechanical right, (2) the
musical work copyright’s performance right, and (3) the sound recording
copyright’s digital performance right.144 What’s costly to Interactives,
however, is not the need to license all three rights; rather, it’s the differences
in how these rights’ royalty rates are regulated.145 While the musical work
copyright’s mechanical and performance rights are regulated by their
respective regulatory bodies (the CRB and the rate courts), the sound
recording copyright’s digital performance right is freely negotiated between
the record labels and Interactives.146 As a result of this dynamic, sound
recording copyright owners generally bargain for and receive significantly

140. See Castillo, supra note 131.
141. Id. The majority of music streamed on Interactives worldwide is licensed from three
to four major record labels—Universal, Sony, and Warner, and the indie music agency ,
Merlin. See Andrew Nusca, Spotify Saved the Music Industry. Now What?, FORTUNE (Oct. 21, 2019,
1:30 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/spotify-music-industry-profits-apple-amazon/.
142. See Castillo, supra note 131.
143. Registration Statement, supra note 134.
144. See generally supra Parts III.A–B (discussing mechanical and performance licensing
requirements for Interactive streaming).
145. See Nusca, supra note 141. See generally supra Parts III.A–B (discussing the different
regulations for Interactive streaming and the different royalty rates that apply).
146. See Nusca, supra note 141. See generally supra Parts III.A–B.
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higher royalties than do musical work copyright owners.147
The disparity in payments made by Interactives to the separate copyrights
is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of music streamed worldwide
is licensed from, and monopolized by, four major record labels. 148
Spotify, for example, reports that 87% of its streams are of songs whose
sound recording rights are owned by these major labels. 149
Additionally, of the annual revenue Spotify reportedly pays out to
copyright owners, 50% is paid to sound recording copyright
owners 150—which means that 43.5% of Spotify’s music licensing
expenses are collectively paid to Universal, Sony, Warner, and
Merlin. 151
Clearly, these major record labels have unregulated monopoly
power 152 over the price of popular streamed music and, thus, can
prevent Interactives from ever being profitable. 153 Considering the
growing popularity of Interactives, and the systematic dependency
between Interactives and these major record labels, it is unlikely that
the cost of sound recording licensing will decrease; rather, it will likely
continue to scale as Interactives do. 154 Thus, Spotify’s concerns over
147. See LaFrance, supra note 16, at 315, 317–18.
148. See Nusca, supra note 141; see also Peter Kafka & Rani Molla, Spotify Is Still Burning an
Enormous Amount of Cash, but the Bigger It Gets, the Better It Looks, VOX (Feb. 28, 2018, 3:26 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/2/28/17063892/spotify-ipo-margins-music-labels-streaming.
149. See Registration Statement, supra note 134, at 16–17. In its 2018 IPO Registration Statement,
Spotify reported that 87% of its content came from Universal Music Group, Sony Music
Entertainment, Warner, and Merlin. Id.
150. See Mechanical Royalties Guide 2019, ROYALTY EXCH. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.
royaltyexchange.com/blog/mechanical-royalties#sthash.gJV6xrux.knQbcrT0.dpbs. The remaining
50% is split between the various kinds of musical work copyright licenses. Id.
151. See id.; see also Registration Statement, supra note 134, at 16–17.
152. See Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (quoting
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956)), https://www.justice.
gov/atr/monopoly-power-and-market-power-antitrust-law (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (defining
“monopoly power” as “the power to control prices or exclude competition”).
153. See Registration Statement, supra note 134, at 16. Spotify, in fact, warned prospective
shareholders that the “high level of concentration” in the music industry posed a risk for its business,
because “one or a small number of entities . . . [could] take actions that [would] adversely affect [their]
business.” Id.
154. See Marc Hogan, The Record Industry Expects a Windfall. Where Will the Money Go?,
PITCHFORK (May 30, 2019), https://pitchfork.com/features/article/the-record-industry-expects-awindfall-where-will-the-money-go/.
In recent years, several financial institutions have predicted [that] record labels will soon
be celebrating annual revenues that begin to approach, if not surpass, their late-1990s
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increased mechanical royalties are warranted 155 because an increase in
mechanical royalty rates will only result in higher music licensing
expenses and greater annual losses for Spotify. 156 And because Spotify
does not own a complementary business or sell complementary
products to offset its losses, “there’s no guarantee that [it] will hold
[on].” 157
2. The Cost of Research and Development
In addition to spending 70% of its annual revenue on music licensing,
Spotify spends another 9–10% of its annual revenue on research and
development (R&D).158 Since its 2008 launch, Spotify has developed
unprecedented and sophisticated uses for big data, artificial intelligence, and
machine learning.159 Some of these uses include: (1) artist access to live,

peaks: What was an inflation-adjusted $25 billion-per-year business before the millennium
could bring in more than $41 billion annually by 2030, according to Goldman Sachs.
Id. As a result, Universal, for example, is speculated to be worth approximately $50 billion. Id.
155. See SPOTIFY ARTISTS NEWS, supra note 5. In a statement following their notice of intent to
appeal, Spotify accurately identified this concern:
Music services, artists, songwriters and all other rightsholders share the same revenue
stream, and it’s natural for everyone to want a bigger piece of that pie. . . . The CRB judges
set the new publishing rates by assuming that record labels would react by reducing their
licensing rates, but their assumption is incorrect.”
Id.
156. Cf. Nusca, supra note 141 (finding it doubtful Spotify will survive and noting that, since the
CRB published its 2018–2022 rate determinations, Spotify’s shares have fallen 30% in spite of a 15%
gain for the Nasdaq). In fact, economist Judge Strickler emphasized the validity of Spotify’s music
licensing concerns in his dissent. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 2022–31.
Particularly, Strickler discussed Spotify’s profit margins, its limited bargaining power with the record
labels, and the differences between Spotify and Big Tech Interactives, like Apple. Id. Strickler
concluded that Interactives, like Spotify, will not be able to sustain the rate increase without sacrificing
their business models or product quality (i.e., the very things they leverage to compete with Big Tech).
Id.; see infra Part IV.A.2 (analyzing Spotify’s costly product research and development).
157. Nusca, supra note 141; see also Statement of Spotify, supra note 120, at 8 (claiming that the
CRB should not increase mechanical rates because (1) Spotify operates at a loss and (2) Spotify’s
losses are already “largely driven by high royalty costs”).
158. See Pastukhov, supra note 134 (deducting the amount Spotify pays for music licensing);
Spotify Tech. S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 50 (Dec. 31, 2018), https://s22.q4cdn.com/
540910603/files/doc_financials/annual/SPOT_20F_Master-Master_Exhibits_HTML.pdf (indicating
that Spotify has spent from 9–10% in R&D since 2017).
159. See Barnard Marr, The Amazing Ways Spotify Uses Big Data, AI and Machine Learning to
Drive Business Success, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/bernardmarr/2017/10/30/the-amazing-ways-spotify-uses-big-data-ai-and-machine-learning-to-
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comprehensive analytics (Spotify for Artists); (2) customized playlists that
recommend undiscovered music to subscribers based on their activity
(Discovery Weekly); and (3) subscriber access to sociological insights derived
from Spotify’s data (Spotify Insights).160 More recently, Spotify launched a
beta project directed at creating podcaster access to analytics (Spotify for
Podcasters).161 Spotify also opened an R&D headquarters in London, where
it intends to employ over five hundred software developers.162
While Songwriters may argue that these developments are superfluous
expenses that fail to justify Spotify’s position, the reality is that Spotify needs
to invest in these unique user experiences to compete with its deep-pocketed
competitors.163 Indeed, because of Spotify’s unique product, it has managed
to remain a world leader in its industry despite its inability to compete in price
wars.164
Additionally, all music industry participants—including
Songwriters—should be wary of discouraging Interactives from reinvesting
in their user experiences and, even more so, of discounting the value of their
user experiences.165 In fact, it was these efforts that succeeded in “saving” the

drive-business-success/#297b85fb4bd2; see also RPARK, Spotify May Know You Better Than You
Realize, HARVARD BUS. SCH. DIGIT. INITIATIVE, https://digital.hbs.edu/platform-digit/
submission/spotify-may-know-you-better-than-you-realize/ (updated Apr. 8, 2018).
160. See generally Statement of Spotify, supra note 120, at 6–7, 14.
161. See Ashley Carman, Spotify’s Pitch to Podcasters: Valuable Listener Data, THE VERGE (Aug.
13, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/13/20802018/spotify-for-podcastersdashboard-live-beta-analytics.
162. See Daniel Sanchez, Spotify Formally Opens Its R&D Center in London, Creating 300 New
Jobs, DIGIT. MUSIC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2019/04/17/spotifyrd-center-london/.
163. See Aisha Hassan, Spotify Plants to Get Ahead of Amazon, Google, and Apple on Their Own
Turf, QUARTZ (Nov. 2, 2018), https://qz.com/1449609/spotify-plans-to-beat-amazon-google-appleon-their-own-turf/. To compete with Amazon, Google, and Apple, Spotify invests in its “user
experience at the expense of profits.” Id.
164. See, e.g., Tim Ingham, Streaming Price War Breaks Out as Google Offers 4 Free Months of
Play, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/
streaming-price-war-breaks-out-as-google-offers-4-free-months-of-play/ (describing a 2016 price war
between Google, Amazon, Apple, and Spotify, in which Spotify proved the least capable of lowering
prices).
165. See Andrew Flanagan, ‘Songwriters Are Not Treated Fairly’: Nile Rodgers on Streaming’s
Present and Future, NPR (Apr. 12, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/12/
712777873/nile-rodgers-streaming-payments-songwriters-letter-spotify. In an interview with NPR,
the celebrated songwriter, artist, and current chairman of the Songwriters Hall of Fame, Nile Rodgers,
said, “people do not pay $10 a month to be able to push buttons on their technology—they spend their
money to listen to The Beatles, Dua Lipa, Led Zeppelin, Beyoncé.” Id. On one hand, Rodgers is
correct: music is central to the business of Interactives. Id. However, without the appeal of their
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music industry from its devastating, multi-decade battle against music
piracy.166 By engaging music listeners who would otherwise pirate,
Interactives “increased royalty payments to music publishers [and
Songwriters], where such publishers were previously receiving zero royalties
from illegal sources.”167
B. Songwriters’ Problem: Inadequate Compensation
On the other side of this “war” is the National Music Publishers
Association (the NMPA), a non-profit organization composed of songwriters,
publishers, and lawyers.168 The NMPA has been the primary advocate for
musical work copyright owners throughout the CRB’s 2018–2022 mechanical
rate determinations and subsequent appeal.169 In response to Spotify’s intent
to appeal, the NMPA published a blog post “fact-checking” Spotify’s claims
and accusing Spotify of “falsehood,” “decei[t],” and “attack[ing]

innovative, user-friendly platforms and “buttons,” the music industry would likely still be fighting to
survive the surge of music piracy it was experiencing prior to the popularity of Interactives. See
generally Nusca, supra note 141 (stating Spotify was pitched as a potential solution to music piracy).
And although Rodgers may “hope for a swift resolution that has no impact on [the] growth” of
Interactives, his hope is but a pipedream. Flanagan, supra; see also supra note 131 and accompanying
text (discussing Spotify’s unlikelihood to change its business model). The only Interactives whose
growth will not be stunted are those, unlike Spotify, that are bolstered by deep pockets and least
incentivized to compete on product quality. See Stefan Etienne, The Best Music Streaming Service,
THE VERGE (Oct. 5, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/this-is-my-next/2018/10/5/
17927798/best-music-streaming-service-price-comparison-features (finding Spotify is the “best
streaming music service for a variety of reasons” because it “has the best app experience,” and finding
Apple Music to be second best because of its library, despite its subpar user experience).
166. See Roxana Maddahi, The Music Industry: From Piracy to Profits, FORBES (July 10, 2018,
8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2018/07/10/the-music-industry-frompiracy-to-profits/#3625fb8070f8 (“After being crushed by piracy for nearly two decades, streaming is
allowing users to have the experience they want at a price they can afford. . . . [T]he past two years
have been the first years of material growth since the [1999] peak with an increase in industry revenues
of 16.5% in 2017.”). In 2006 (the year Spotify launched), the music industry’s annual revenue was
only 80% of the annual revenue in 1999. See Nusca, supra note 141.
167. Statement of Spotify, supra note 120, at 11. In a memorandum presented before the CRB,
Spotify’s expert witnesses testified that Interactives have benefitted the music industry by decreasing
piracy and increasing royalty payments to copyright owners. Id.
168. See Introductory Memorandum of National Music Publishers’ Association and Nashville
Songwriters Association International at 1, No. 16-CRB-0003-PR (2018–2022) [hereinafter Statement
of Songwriters Vol. 1], https://www.crb.gov/rate/16-CRB-0003-PR/statements/copyright-owners/
volume1.pdf.
169. See id. at 3.
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songwriters.”170 It read:
Ok—there is spin, and then there is black and white falsehood.
Spotify alleges the CRB judges “assumed” record labels would react
to the publisher rate increase by reducing their rates. Not only is that
not true, the judges wrote the opposite in their opinion. For those
who want to fact check, read footnote 75 on page 35 of the CRB’s
Final Determination.171 . . . Simple solution—let songwriters and
publishers negotiate the value of their copyright the same way that
record labels do—but Spotify opposes that.172
During the CRB’s initial proceedings, the NMPA made similar
accusations.173 They stated: “[T]he songwriters and publishers, because they
are constrained by the compulsory license, have been subsidizing these tech
giants’ other business strategies.”174 The NMPA specifically accused Spotify

170. See Spotify Blog Post Insults Songwriters by Attempting to Deceive Them—A Fact Check,
NMPA MEDIA [hereinafter A Fact Check], http://nmpa.org/spotify-blog-post-insults-songwriters-byattempting-to-deceive-them-a-fact-check/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
171. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1934 n.75. Footnote 75 of the CRB’s
Rate Determinations actually states:
Google notes, concerning its proposal, that the removal of a cap on TCC “does leave the
services exposed to the labels’ market power, and would warrant close watching if
adopted.” While true, Google fails to note that the services are already exposed to the
labels’ market power. Record companies could, if they so chose, put the Services out of
business entirely. Uncapping the TCC rate prong does not change that. Nor can any
decision by this tribunal. While the possibility of the record companies using their market
power in a way that harms the Services is a real concern, the Judges cannot allow that
concern to grow into a form of paralysis, where any change from the status quo is deemed
too dangerous to contemplate. Any increase in mechanical royalty rates, whether or not
they are computed with reference to record company royalties, has the potential of leading
to a bad outcome for the Services. Even maintaining the status quo could lead to a bad
outcome for the Services, as it surely would for the songwriters and publishers. Ultimately
the Judges must go where the evidence leads them and, as with any economic exercise,
trust in the rational self-interest of the market participants.
Id. (citation omitted).
172. A Fact Check, supra note 170. While the NMPA was correct in stating that the manner in
which Interactives and record labels negotiate payment “has no relationship to the value of the songs,”
the NMPA failed to note the final sentence in footnote seventy-five, where the CRB places “trust in
the rational self-interest of the market participants”—which can reasonably be interpreted to mean the
CRB hopes or assumes “the record companies [will not use] their market power in a way that harms
[Interactives].” Id.; 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1934 n.75.
173. See generally Statement of Songwriters Vol. 1, supra note 168.
174. Id. at A-4.
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of “mak[ing] its owners very wealthy” and “increasing [the value of] its $8.5
billion enterprise” at the cost of Songwriters and their publishers.175
However, while Songwriters are most definitely systemic victims and
entitled to better pay, the same argument can be made for Spotify.176 While
increasing mechanical rates by 44% may console Songwriters in the shortterm, the but-for cause177—the prejudicial treatment of sound recording
rights—will subsist in the long run.178 On a macro level, this heightened cost
of entry is a legitimate concern: are we paving the way for “Big Tech” to
assume unfettered control of yet another industry?179 Or, if not for them, for
“the major record labels—which already hold an equity stake in Spotify [and]
could take over [Spotify] if it fails?”180
1. The Cost of Publishing
Interactives are becoming the primary source of mechanical income—a
legitimate concern for Songwriters and their publishers.181 As mentioned
175. Id. at A-3–4.
176. See generally supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the cost of music licensing). Spotify, like the
Songwriters, is forced to operate within a system marked by inequitably valued copyrights (of the
same song) and evergreen competitors (who are assuming control of their industry and innumerable
other ones). See supra Part IV.A.1.
177. See Proximate Cause, FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
But+for+causation (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (defining a “but-for cause,” i.e., proximate cause, as an
“act from which an injury results as a natural, direct, uninterrupted consequence and without which
the injury would not have occurred”).
178. See generally supra Parts II.D–III.B (considering the sound recordings Act of 1995 and the
Music Modernization Act).
179. See Farhad Manjoo, Can Washington Stop Big Tech Companies? Don’t Bet on It, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/technology/regulating-tech-companies.html
(“We are now at another great turning point in the global economy. A handful of technology
companies, the Frightful Five—Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Amazon, the largest
American corporations by stock-market value—control the technological platforms that will dominate
life for the foreseeable future.”). It’s impressive that Spotify has endured this long, given the tech
landscape. Cf. How 5 Tech Giants Have Become More Like Governments Than Companies, NPR
(Oct. 26, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.npr.org /2017/10/26/560136311/how-5-tech-giants-havebecome-more-like-governments-than-companies (“[O]ne of the things that these five companies have
done . . . masterfully is create these platforms that startups have to use to get to customers.”).
180. ALAN B. KRUEGER, ROCKONOMICS 201 (2019). Krueger notes: “[T]hat would create an
obvious conflict of interest, as they would have an incentive to promote their own music over that
from independent labels” and their artists. Id.
181. See Amy X. Wang, Album Sales Are Dying as Fast as Streaming Services Are Rising, ROLLING
STONE (Jan. 3, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/album-sales-dyingas-fast-as-streaming-services-rising-774563/. But see 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note
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above, the CRB sets the price of both physical and digital mechanical
licenses.182 Currently, the mechanical license rate for physical sales/digital
downloads is priced at 9.1 cents, while that of interactive streaming is priced
at a mere fraction of a cent.183 Considering the rate at which physical and
digital sales are falling (18–29% annually) and the rapid rate at which
interactive streaming is growing (41–42% annually), listeners’ preferences
indicate that “music consumption itself is permanently changed.”184 Musical
work copyright owners will make increasingly less money from mechanical
licenses as purchasers convert into streamers.185
In a memorandum before the CRB, Songwriters foretold: “The result will
be that music publishers will no longer be able to make the early-stage
investments in songwriters that are necessary to develop the next generation
of great songwriters to add to the American songbook.”186 Though
hyperbolic, this statement at its root is sound.187 Due to the purchaserstreamer conversion rate, in a vacuum, publishers will make less money
annually—money that could otherwise be used to pay Songwriters’ advances

101, at 1922 (stating that in 2012, 36% of publishers’ royalties came from mechanical royalties; in
2014, 23% of publishers’ royalties came from mechanical royalties; but publishing revenue actually
increased overall from 2014 to 2015).
182. See supra Parts II.D.2, III.A.
183. See Mechanical Royalties Guide 2019, supra note 150 (“The mechanical streaming rate is
about $0.06 per 100 streams, or $0.0006 per stream.”).
184. See Wang, supra note 181 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Cf. id. (“The dwindling popularity of music purchases—which is driven by listener preference
as well as the music industry’s shift of focus away from sales, giving it a knock-on effect for retailers
and buyers—can also be seen in the shares of total album consumption in 2018.”).
186. See Statement of Songwriters Vol. 1, supra note 168, at A-4.
187. See The Songwriter and Music Publisher Relationship: Part I, ROYALTY EXCH. (Dec. 26,
2017), https://www.royaltyexchange.com/blog/the-songwriter-and-music-publisher-relationship-pt-1
#sthash.Ts1SM3Sj.dpbs. Under the typical publishing deal between a beginner songwriter and a
music publisher, a songwriter will sign over 50% of its future copyright ownership for a term or series
of terms. Id. In return, publishers will typically pay them an advance of, for example, $50,000.00.
Id. In fact, “the costs and investments that publishers make in finding and developing songwriters”
nearly match the costs and investments record labels make “in finding and developing recording
artists.” See Witness Statement of David M. Israelite at 29, No. 16-CRB-0003-PR (2018–2022),
https://www.crb.gov/rate/16-CRB-0003-PR/statements/copyright-owners/volume1.pdf.
For
example,
in the UK, record labels spent £178 million on A&R [(i.e., artist development)] in 2014,
while music publishers spent £162 million. Yet, as it has also been publicly reported,
[Interactives] generally pay the record labels between 55% and 60% of their revenues, and
songwriters and publishers a fraction of that amount.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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and operating expenses.188 Therefore, in order to sustain this evolution in
listener consumption, something must change: if not the mechanical rate,
perhaps music copyright law.189
2. The Cost of Living
Most Songwriters are struggling financially, particularly those
Songwriters whose only source of income is music.190 In support of increasing
the mechanical rate, Songwriters described financial hardships faced by a
majority of songwriters in today’s streaming economy:
The middle class of songwriters now struggles to earn a decent living.
[Once] [s]uccessful songwriters are leaving the business because they
cannot support their families on the dramatically reduced mechanical
income they earn from interactive streaming. The few superstar
songwriters (largely recording artist-songwriters)[,] who are still
earning substantial mechanical income from interactive streaming
based on hundreds of millions of streams[,] also are earning
significantly less than they were earning from album sales and
downloads.191
“Songwriters are creators.”192 Without their lyrics and compositions, we
would have no music.193 Because society values music, Congress sought to
financially incentivize its creation through copyright protection.194 Logically,

188. See supra text accompanying note 181; Wang, supra note 181.
189. See infra Part V (proposing restructuring music copyright law to solve Songwriters’
compensation problems); accord Paula Mejía, The Success of Streaming Has Been Great for Some,
But Is There a Better Way?, NPR (July 22, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2019/07/22/743775196/the-success-of-streaming-has-been-great-for-some-but-is-there-a-better-way
(“While streaming is the music industry’s most visible economic driver these days, its problems are
historical in proportion. ‘Capitalism has a role in this problem . . . . But I think also how our legal
system is built is that instead of usually rewriting something, they'll just build on it. And we’ve been
putting Band-Aids on this for I don't know, 100 years?’”).
190. See, e.g., Witness Statement of Peter S. Brodsky at 40, No. 16-CRB-0003-PR (2018–2022)
[hereinafter Statement of Peter Brodsky], https://www.crb.gov/rate/16-CRB-0003-PR/statements/
copyright-owners/volume2.pdf.
191. See Statement of Songwriters Vol. 1, supra note 168, at A-4.
192. KRUEGER, supra note 180, at 208.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 207.
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it follows then that Songwriters would create less music if their financial
incentives were inadequate—but modern studies indicate otherwise.195
During the 2000’s Napster era, economist Joel Waldfogel studied the
weakening effect of music piracy on copyright protection.196 Waldfogel
discovered that, although musicians were unable to enforce copyright
protection, “the total volume of music produced actually increased, rather than
decreased.”197 Modern musicians—for reasons economists Waldfogel and
Allen Krueger can only hypothesize—seem to create high-quality music
absent the assurance of copyright protection.198 So clearly, what incentivizes
songwriters to create music is more complicated than the promise of copyright
protection and financial gain.199
Nonetheless, the fact is that Congress exercised its Article I powers and
created music copyright protection to compensate its creators and, ultimately,
promote music.200 Yet modern copyright law does not compensate
songwriters (i.e., the creators of songs) as well as it compensates the record
labels exploiting their creations.201 Thus, although it’s likely Songwriters will
continue producing music in spite of copyright reform, it’s also true that music
copyright protection disproportionately compensates, and arguably promotes,

195. Id. at 209. Basic to economics is the belief that property rights are essential for societal
function. Id. “Why would you invest in something if you were unsure of whether you could share in
the returns?” Id.
196. Id. at 211.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 211–12. Waldfogel and Krueger proposed that music production increased, despite
lacking copyright protection, because of coinciding, low-cost developments in technology. Id. There
is, however, a study of nineteenth century Italian music copyright protection that shows an empirical
correlation between copyright protection and musical output. Id. at 212–13. Economists Michela
Giorcelli and Petra Moser concluded that operatic composers in states that adopted copyright
protection, like Lombardy and Venice, increased operatic production by 150%, compared to those
states where compositions were unprotected. Id.
199. Id. at 213. Although it may be true that songwriters, in some cases, are being forced to “leav[e]
the [music] business because they cannot support their families,” Statements of Copyright Owners,
supra note 3, at A-4, this fact does not support the contention that increasing the mechanical rate will
result in maximum music production and availability at the macrolevel. See Statement of Peter
Brodsky, supra note 190, at 40.
200. See generally supra Part II.A. As explained supra, Congress created copyright law to promote
“useful arts,” a power rooted in Article I of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
201. See generally supra Parts II.D–III.A. In regard to interactive digital streaming, the
composition copyright (the kind of music copyright owned by songwriters) is limited by statutory
regulation, while the sound recording copyright is unlimited and, thus, can technically be priced at
whatever its owner deems appropriate. See generally supra Parts II.D–III.A.
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the exploitation of songs, not their creation.202 In 2019, this distinction played
a central role in the CRB’s 2018–2022 mechanical rate determinations.203
C. The Copyright Royalty Board Analyzes Spotify’s and Songwriters’
Problems and Determines a 44% Mechanical Rate Increase for 2018–
2022
To determine the 2018–2022 mechanical rates, the CRB applied the
MMA’s new “willing buyer/willing seller” factors: (1) maximizing the
availability of creative works (maximizing availability); (2) affording
copyright user fair income and copyright owner a fair return (fair income); (3)
reflecting on the relative roles of copyright owners and copyright users with
respect to creative contribution, technological contribution, capital
investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new markets for
creative expression (relative roles); and (4) minimizing disruptive
improvements on the structure of the industries involved and on generally
prevailing industry practices (minimizing disruption).204 After considering
the parties’ arguments and expert testimony, the majority of the CRB205
determined that the willing buyer/willing seller factors weighed strongly in
favor of a 44% mechanical rate increase, contrary to the dissenting opinion of
their economics expert, Judge Strickler.206
Despite strong evidence to the contrary,207 the majority concluded that the
first factor, maximizing availability, weighed in favor of increasing the

202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. Compare Statement of Songwriters Vol. 1, supra
note 168, at A-4 (noting that some songwriters are leaving the business due to insufficient
compensation), with 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1935 (noting the need to
balance the “protection of the songwriter’s livelihood” in light of their contributions with the “[]fair
impact on the income of the copyright users”).
203. See infra Part IV.C.1. See generally 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101.
204. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1955; see also Music Modernization
Act, supra note 93, at § 801(b)(1).
205. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1958. In 2018, the majority CRB was
comprised of Judge Barnett (the chief judge) and Judge Feder (the copyright law expert). Id. at 1963;
see also About Us, supra note 79 and accompanying text (delineating the roles within the CRB). Judge
Strickler (the economics expert) held the sole dissenting opinion. See 2018–2022 Rate
Determinations, supra note 101, at 1963; see also About Us, supra note 79 and accompanying text
(noting the differing roles within the CRB and the Judges’ individual backgrounds).
206. See infra Parts IV.C.1–4.
207. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing modern empirical studies that suggest
that Songwriters will likely continue producing music in spite of copyright reform).
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mechanical rate.208 In its analysis, the majority noted that the Songwriters’
claim that higher mechanical rates correlated with increased music production
was “largely anecdotal and unsupported.”209 The majority also noted that
higher mechanical rates would (1) mean greater licensing expenses for all
Interactives, and (2) force some Interactives, like Spotify, to limit or eliminate
their “affordable” and “free” subscription options to offset the additional
licensing costs.210 Thus, the majority acknowledged that, by reducing
consumers’ “affordable access” to Interactives, a mechanical rate increase
would minimize, not maximize, the availability of music to many
consumers.211 Still, despite all their findings, the majority somehow reached
208. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1958.
209. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1958. In spite of the evidence, the
majority judges puzzlingly concluded:
Although largely anecdotal and unsupported by sophisticated surveys, studies, or economic
theories[,] . . . [the Songwriters’ cost of publishing and cost of living] evidence points
strongly to the need to increase royalty rates to ensure the continued viability of
songwriting as a profession. The rate determined by the Judges represents a 44% increase
over the current headline rate, and thus satisfies the [“maximizing availability” factor’s]
objective in this respect as well.
Id.
210. See id. Spotify, for example, offers its consumers five subscription tiers: (1) Spotify Free,
which is significantly less interactive than its Premium options and is ad-supported; (2) Premium
Individual for $9.99 a month; (3) Premium Duo for $12.99 a month; (4) Premium Family for $14.99
a month, which includes six separate family member accounts; and (5) Premium Student for $4.99 a
month. See Why Go Premium?, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/premium (last visited Jan. 14,
2021). The practice of offering a service at varying prices depending on what each customer can pay
is called “price discrimination.” See Alexandra Twin, Price Discrimination, INVESTOPEDIA
(last
updated
Jul.
4,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/price_
discrimination.asp (defining “price discrimination” as “a selling strategy that charges customers
different prices for the same product or service based on what the seller thinks they can get the
customer to agree to,” i.e., “the seller charges each customer the maximum price he or she will pay”).
But price discriminating practices, such as Spotify’s tiered-subscription model, are only possible when
businesses have “financial flexibility.” See Soku Byoun, Financial Flexibility, Firm Size and Capital
Structure, HANKAMER SCH. BUS., BAYLOR U. (Oct. 2007), https://www.baylor.edu/business/
finance/doc.php/230999.pdf (defining “financial flexibility” as the “ability to leverage capital”).
Because increasing the mechanical royalty rate means greater licensing expenses for Interactives,
increasing the mechanical royalty rate also means limiting Interactives’ capital gains and thereby
financial flexibility. Cf. id. Therefore, increasing the mechanical royalty rate would limit Interactives’
abilities to offer affordable, price-discriminating subscription options. Cf. 2018–2022 Rate
Determinations, supra note 101, at 1958 (stating that “maximizing availability,” meaning
“expand[ing] the overall consumption of music,” requires a “rate structure that enhances the ability of
the [Interactives] to engage in downstream price discrimination”).
211. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1958 (concluding that “a price
discriminatory model,” such as Spotify’s model, which offers multi-tiered subscription options, would
in fact “maximize[] [music] availability”). In February 2020, Spotify reported that nearly 54% of its
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the conclusion that increasing the mechanical rate was consistent with the
“maximizing availability” factor.212
The majority CRB combined its analysis of the second and third factors,
“fair income” and “relative roles,” using an approach modeled after a game
theory called the Shapley value.213 The Shapley value assumes all parties to
“the bargain”—in this case, Interactives, Songwriters, and record labels—are
cooperating.214 Based on that assumption, the Shapley value assigns each
party to the bargain a “fair” value based on the parties’ contributions to the
bargain process, where a fair value is defined as the plausible outcome of a
“competitive bargaining process.”215 In practice, however, the majority CRB
applied a quasi-Shapley value approach that established a mechanical rate
unrepresentative of a “fair” bargain between Songwriters and Interactives,
including Spotify.216
Dissenting, Judge Strickler—the economics expert on the CRB panel—
correctly recognized two major ways in which the majority’s combined

271 million active users accessed its streaming services through Spotify Free. See Spotify Reports
Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2019 Earnings, SPOTIFY: FOR THE RECORD (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://newsroom.spotify.com/2020-02-05/spotify-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2019earnings/. Moreover, Spotify reported that its Spotify Premium subscribers grew by 29% in 2019,
largely because Spotify had the financial flexibility to offer its new Premium subscribers varied
payment options and three months free. See id.
212. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1958. In his dissent, economist Judge
Strickler cited the majority analysis and criticized the majority’s contradictory finding that the
“maximizing availability” factor weighed in favor of increasing the mechanical rate. Id. at 2017–18.
213. See id. at 1958–59. This approach is a modification of what economists call the “Shapley value
approach,” which is used “primarily in situations when the contributions of each actor are unequal,
but each player works in cooperation with each other to obtain” a profit. See Will Kenton, Shapley
Value, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shapley-value.asp.
“The bargain,” in this case, is the collective term for the separate licensing agreements between
Interactives and sound recording copyright owners, and between Interactives and Songwriters. See
2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 2020.
214. Contra 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 2022–24. Notably, the dissent
found that the majority’s approach was faulty because it assumed that record labels would cooperate
and accommodate the imposition of higher mechanical rates on Interactives by negotiating for lower
sound recording fees. Id.
215. See id. at 1959 n.156 (defining “fairness” as the “outcome of [the] competitive market”). In
other words, the Shapley value approach is intended to simulate a “fair” bargain, or a bargain where
all parties involved have equal, competitive bargaining power. Id. Thus, the Shapley approach
assumes each party to the bargain “add[s] value by agreeing to [partake in] the bargain, and then [it
distributes] to each party their average contribution to the cooperative bargain.” Id. at 1946.
216. See supra Part IV.C.
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approach217 failed to produce a Shapley-value-derived rate: (1) the approach
approximated the ratio of profits all copyright owners should make (i.e.,
Songwriters to record labels) by accounting only for the costs incurred by
copyright owners and completely discounting the costs incurred by
Interactives;218 and (2) the approach failed to nullify the massive bargaining
power possessed by the major record labels.219
First, by failing to account for the Interactives’ essential operating costs,
such as music licensing and R&D,220 the majority failed to determine a “fair”
rate that accurately reflects all the parties’ “roles.”221 If a “fair” rate is the rate
that both Interactives and Songwriters would have bargained for in a
“competitive bargain,” then the majority should have accounted for the
Interactives’ costs, just as it accounted for the copyright owners’ costs,
because the goal of a “competitive bargain” is to offset all the bargainers’
costs and “maximize [their] gains.”222 Thus, by failing to account for the costs
accrued by Interactives downstream,223 the majority’s approach failed to

217. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 2026 (dissenting and concluding that
the “model fails to incorporate sufficiently the reasonableness requirements and the ‘fairness’ and
‘relative roles’ elements of section 801(b)(1)”).
218. Id. The dissent found the majority provided no “convincing evidence to explain why the
Judges should rely on a model that omits from consideration the very licensees who would be paying
the royalties pursuant to [the] rate” imposed. Id. As a result, the applied ratio requires [I]nteractives
“to pay total royalties (sound recording and musical works) greater than their total revenue, leading to
losses despite their undisputed contribution to the total surplus available for distribution.” Id.
219. Id. To derive the ratio for TCC (the ratio of total content cost owed by an Interactive to
composition and sound recording copyright holders), the model utilized profits acquired through the
unregulated, superior bargaining power of record labels. Id. Thus, the approach seemingly resulted
in a fair ratio to Songwriters, assuming either (1) the record labels would negotiate lower sound
recording performance rates to offset the increased mechanical rates and mitigate the Interactives’
increased costs, or (2) the Interactives would absorb the financial burden. Id. at 2029 (dissenting and
recognizing the rate increase’s “disruptive impact” on the Interactives).
220. See supra Parts IV.A.1–2 (detailing Spotify’s costly business model).
221. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1959 n.156.
222. See Gary Goodpaster, Primer on Competitive Bargaining, J. DISP. RESOL. 325, 326 (1996);
see also 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1959 n.156. See generally supra Parts
IV.A.1–2 (explaining Spotify’s principal costs: music licensing and R&D).
223. James Chen, Downstream, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/d/downstream.asp (defining “downstream” as the “processes involved in converting” an
industrial material “into the finished product” (i.e., converting oil into gas)). In this context, the losses
accrued by Interactives downstream refers to the losses accrued by Interactives in the process of
acquiring and converting sound recordings into digitally stream-able formats. Cf. 2018–2022 Rate
Determinations, supra note 101, at 1925 (describing the Interactives’ business model as the
“downstream business model”).
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produce a “fairly” bargained for distribution of mechanical royalties to
Songwriters upstream.224
Second, because the majority failed to account for the record labels’
bargaining power in its calculations, the majority failed to derive an accurate
Shapley value.225 The Shapley value approach “assumes” the parties are
bargaining in a “perfectly competitive market[]”; that is, a market where all
parties to the bargain (i.e., Songwriters, Interactives, and record labels) are
willingly and cooperatively negotiating a price that “fairly” balances the
“marginal benefit” of music (or, its “demand” value) with the marginal cost
of producing music (or, its “supply” cost).226 Here, the parties are not
bargaining in a perfectly competitive market; rather, they are bargaining in an
“imperfect market,”227 where the record labels exploit their monopoly power
and coerce Interactives into paying sound recording rates that far outweigh
their supply costs.228 Thus, because the majority’s analysis did not account or
adjust for the record labels’ collective monopoly power, the majority’s final
rate determination was not an accurate Shapley value and “was inconsistent
with affording [Interactives] a fair income.”229
224. James Chen, Upstream, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/u/upstream.asp (defining “upstream” as the “exploration and production” operations in an
industry). In this context, the “distribution of profits to Songwriters upstream” refers to the rate of
interactive streaming revenue paid by Interactives to musical work copyright owners. See 2018–2022
Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1925 (referring to the copyright owners’ rate structure as the
“upstream rate structure”).
225. See Shapley Value, supra note 213 and accompanying text.
226. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1966, 1977, 2020 n.335; see also
Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, supra note 152.
227. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1977 n.225.
228. Id.
229. Cf. id. at 2028 n.356. Dissenting Judge Strickler reached a similar conclusion:
As a matter of economic theory, given the present interactive streaming market structure,
the record companies already have the economic power to put [Interactives] out of
business, because the market in which record companies and interactive streaming services
negotiate is unregulated. So, I recognize that—given the present interactive streaming
market structure—the record companies apparently find it in their self-interest to maintain
the presence of interactive licensees. . . . [And], if mechanical royalty rates [are] to
increase to a level that significantly reduce[s] the profits of the record companies from
streaming, there is no evidence in the record . . . that indicates [that] the record companies
[will] . . . docilely accept such a revenue loss. . . . [Such an outcome is] inconsistent with
affording [Interactives] a fair income.
Id. (emphasis added).
Unlike Judge Strickler, the majority was untroubled by the fact that Interactives, “like Pandora,
Spotify, and Rhapsody” may not survive the “existing competitive conditions.” Id. at 1960. In fact,

821

[Vol. 48: 785, 2021]

Songwriters v. Spotify
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

The fourth factor, “minimizing disruptions,”230 was not substantively
discussed by the majority because the majority felt that, in any case, “[t]he
[Interactives’] inability to become profitable w[ould] persist” throughout the
streaming era.231 Thus, the majority did not discuss mechanical rates that
would minimize music industry disruption; rather, the majority merely
recommended that Interactives “adequately adapt to the changed
circumstance produced by the rate change.”232 The majority further concluded
that the Interactives’ unprofitability is not owed to the high cost of licensing,
but to their “lack of scale”; thus, the majority suggested that the Interactives
divide their market share among fewer competitors.233 In other words, the
majority suggested that the Interactives’ unprofitability be mitigated by
further concentrating the music industry, rather than by amending music
copyright law.234 The majority is at best naively optimistic.235 If interactive
streaming becomes highly concentrated in the hands of Big Tech (i.e., Apple,
Google, and Amazon) and the few major record labels (i.e., Sony, Universal,
and Warner Music), Interactives will have the monopoly power to extract
unfavorable rights deals from music copyright owners who hold significantly
less market power, including the Songwriters.236 Accordingly, in its analysis
of the fourth factor, the dissent concluded that any mechanical rate increase
would be disruptive to Interactives, especially those with capacity costs,237
the majority acknowledged in its analysis that the final rate determinations left the Interactives
“exposed to the labels’ market power” and in a position of “real concern.” Id. at 1934 n.75.
230. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1959 (defining a disruptive rate as one
that “directly produces an adverse impact that is substantial, immediate and irreversible in the shortrun because there is insufficient time for either [party] to adequately adapt to the changed circumstance
produced by the rate change and, as a consequence, such adverse impacts threaten the viability of the
music delivery service currently offered to consumers under this license”).
231. Id. at 1960.
232. Id.
233. Id.; cf. id. at 1944 n.107 (recognizing that “an increase in the rates might affect different
interactive streaming services in different ways” and result in further concentration of the industry).
234. Id. at 1960.
235. See id. How could it ever benefit musicians to have their music subjected to a few mega
conglomerates like Google or Apple? See David Pakman, Who Holds the Power in Media—Content
or Distribution?, PAKMAN (Oct. 6, 2012), https://pakman.com/who-holds-the-power-in-mediacontent-or-distribution-4cb3decfe2a (“Highly concentrated [distribution of] popular content allows
[distributors] to extract unprofitable rights deals.”).
236. See ELI M. NOAM, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CONCENTRATION IN AMERICA 135 (2009) (stating
that concentrated distribution of music “creates a fundamentally unstable situation” and “creates
enormous incentives for companies to engage in oligopolistic price setting”).
237. What is Capacity Cost?, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/capacity-cost/ (last

822

[Vol. 48: 785, 2021]

Songwriters v. Spotify
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

like Spotify.238 Rather than increase the mechanical rate, the dissent proposed
a reinstatement of the CRB’s 2012 mechanical rate benchmark, which the
dissent concluded would not be disruptive to Songwriters, Interactives, and
the music industry at large.239 While not wrong, the dissent’s proposal is still
inadequate because it fails to address the Songwriters’ lack of adequate pay.240
In sum, Spotify’s appeal is warranted because the majority’s mechanical
rate determination failed to embody the objectives of the mandatory willing
buyer/willing seller standard.241 First, the majority blatantly disregarded the
essential role Interactives play in maximizing the availability of music in the
streaming era.242 Second, because the majority misapplied the Shapley value
approach, it derived a mechanical rate that was neither a fair income for the
Interactives nor reflective of Interactives’ relative roles.243 Third, the majority
failed to consider less disruptive alternatives to the mechanical rate increase
because it assumed that further concentration and disruption of the music
economy was inevitable.244 In light of the foregoing, the majority’s
visited Jan. 14, 2021) (defining “capacity cost” as “[a] fixed expense incurred by a company or
organization in order to provide for or increase its ability to conduct business operations,” and
explaining that capacity costs “generally do not vary with production levels and can be reduced or
avoided only be shutting down business locations or outsourcing”).
238. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 2029 (“Although the [Interactives]
appear able to withstand current rates, a rate increase of the magnitude sought by the [Songwriters]
would run the very real risk of preventing [most Interactives] from surviving the ‘short-run,’
threatening the type of disruption Factor [4] is intended to prevent. Moreover, the 44% rate increase
adopted by the majority likewise places [Interactives] in quite uncharted waters regarding the
disruptive impact of that increase.”); see also id. (“Without a record to consider the impact of that rate
increase, the majority may simply be substituting a slow bleed for a fatal blow.”). Even the majority
recognized that Big Tech Interactives, like Amazon and Apple, will be the only Interactives capable
of sustaining the mechanical rate increase, since their interactive streaming services operate as loss
leaders. Id. at 1944 n.107. “The majority actually recognize[d] that the [rate] increase is so draconian
that it cannot be implemented immediately.” Id. at 2029; see also id. at 1960 (acknowledging that
“[i]n order to mitigate the risk of short-term market disruption . . . the Judges will phase in the new
rate in equal annual increments over the rate period”).
239. Id. at 2029.
240. See infra Part IV.D (proposing an amendment to music copyright law and a re-adjustment of
the music licensing scheme for the sound recording and musical work copyrights); supra Part IV.B
(describing Songwriters’ problems concerning inadequate compensation).
241. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing the majority’s application of the four willing buyer/willing
seller factors).
242. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing majority’s application of the maximizing availability factor).
243. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing majority’s application of the fair income and relative roles
factors).
244. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing majority’s application of the fair income and relative roles
factors).
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reasonable, market-based rate is not so reasonable.245
D. Solving Spotify’s and Songwriters’ Problems Without Increasing the
Mechanical Rate
“All value in the music industry begins with songs.”246 The value of
songs’ sound recordings and the value of Interactives are both derived from
the existence of songs.247 Thus, it is unfair that the current licensing scheme
results in record labels being better compensated than the creators of songs,
and it is unfair that most Songwriters make a meager living.248 However, the
unfairness does not stem from Interactives’ unwillingness to pay Songwriters
more for their songs.249 In reality, “under current economic conditions,” most
Interactives can’t pay Songwriters more for their songs.250 The root of the
Songwriters’ inadequate pay is the disproportionate, statutory regulation of
their songs’ dual copyrights.251
Streaming is the dominant form of music consumption.252 Yet, most of
the relevant music copyright laws were written before streaming technology
was commonly used.253 Failure to acknowledge the nuances of streaming
245. Contra 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1955 (claiming to have determined
a reasonable, market-based rate).
246. Statement of Peter Brodsky, supra note 190, at 40.
247. See id.
248. See id. (stating that “the current rate structure results in songwriters and publishers being
undercompensated for the value they provide”); Statement of Songwriters Vol. 1, supra note 167, at
A-4 (“The middle class of songwriters now struggles to earn a decent living.”).
249. See, e.g., SPOTIFY ARTISTS NEWS, supra note 5 (“Does Spotify think [S]ongwriters deserve to
be paid more? Yes—this is important to [S]ongwriters and it’s important to Spotify.”).
250. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 2022–31 (finding that Interactives,
like Spotify, will not be able to sustain the rate increase without sacrificing their business models or
product quality (i.e., the very things they leverage to compete with Big Tech)). See generally id. at
1958–59 (explaining that a fair income under the willing buyer/willing seller standard requires
providing Songwriters with a fair return for their songs and Interactives with a fair income “under
existing economic conditions”).
251. See SPOTIFY ARTISTS NEWS, supra note 5 (“The industry needs to continue evolving to ensure
that the people who create the music we all love—artists and [S]ongwriters—can earn a living. The
question is how best to achieve that goal.”); cf. Mejía, supra note 189 (“[I]nstead of [] rewriting [music
copyright law], they’ll just build on it. And we’ve been putting Band-Aids on this for I don’t know,
100 years?”). See generally supra Parts I–III (explaining the origin and monetization of a song’s dual
copyrights: the musical work copyright and the sound recording copyright).
252. LaFrance, supra note 16, at 311.
253. Arthur Chang, Outdated and Ineffective: The Problems with Copyright Law, CLAREMONT J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y (Apr. 11, 2018), https://5clpp.com/2018/04/11/outdated-and-ineffective-the-
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technology and to adjust music copyright law accordingly culminated into a
problematic system that inadequately compensates Songwriters.254 While
Songwriters’ musical work copyrights continue being subjected to centuryold compulsory mechanical rates and performance consent decrees,255 record
labels’ sound recording copyrights are subjected to zero rate regulation and
thus remain freely negotiable.256
If the failure to pay [Songwriters] fair and reasonable royalties
persists, the music industry will inevitably lose creatives, who are the
very heart of the industry. If [Songwriters] are unable to support
themselves as fulltime musicians, they will be forced to commit less
time and effort to producing the music. Not only will this be
extremely detrimental to the quality of music and entertainment, but
it will also negatively affect the [Interactives that] underpay these
musicians. In fact, it is in the best interest of the entire music industry
to properly compensate [Songwriters], as they create the music that
sustains the business.257
In order to better compensate Songwriters, “legislation must be
amended.”258
Congress could amend music copyright law in the following two ways:
(1) Congress could strengthen Songwriters’ bargaining power by deregulating
the musical work copyright and allowing Songwriters to freely negotiate their
mechanical rights with Interactives,259 or (2) Congress could lessen the record
labels’ bargaining power by assigning a regulatory body to oversee the rates

problems-with-copyright-law/; see also LaFrance, supra note 16, at 311.
254. See Chang, supra note 253.
255. See supra Part II.B (explaining the legislative origins of compulsory mechanical licenses and
performance consent decrees during the early twentieth century).
256. See supra Part II.C (explaining the legislative origin of the unregulated sound recording
copyright during the 1970s).
257. See Chang, supra note 253.
258. Id. (“To preserve the music industry and its constituents, Congress must work in conjunction
with the private sector to rectify the shortcomings of copyright legislation and modernize the existing
law.”).
259. Cf. Scott Hanus, Deregulating the Music Industry: A Push to Give Power Back to the
Songwriters, 16 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 18, 36 (2018) (advocating an amendment to music
copyright law that “would allow the songwriters and publishers to negotiate directly with streaming
services for licensing fees, as well as allow them more freedom in determining who can license their
music”).
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and terms of the sound recording copyright.260 In either case, Songwriters
would theoretically have the opportunity to claim or bargain for a larger cut
of Interactives’ revenues, without increasing Interactives’ operating
expenses.261
However, while the music industry awaits legislative reform,262
Songwriters should also organize and assert themselves to gain fairer pay
through sound recording royalties.263 Currently, record labels are sharing a
fraction of their sound recording royalties with music producers.264
Additionally, because music producers are often songwriters, they also
receive the same musical work royalties as songwriters.265 Since owning a
song’s sound recording copyright is “really the only way you make money
[through] streaming,” some music industry executives, music producers, and
songwriters are also advocating for songwriters to receive a share of sound

260. Cf. Chang, supra note 253 (noting “the absence of a uniform rate-setting standard for statutory
license fees” and recommending “an overhauled single rate standard that will reflect the fair market
value of copyrighted works”).
261. See supra Part IV.A (describing Spotify’s operating expenses: music licensing and R&D).
262. See Chang, supra note 253 (“As technology continually develops and evolves, it is constantly
changing the scope of copyright law. Consequently, legal delay is an inherent complication, as
copyright law inevitably will struggle to maintain stride with technology. Nevertheless, it is
unreasonable to expect Congress, through its intentionally arduous and deliberate legislative process,
to constantly alter laws at the rapid pace of technological dissemination. Indeed, few bills and
amendments have recently been passed in order to adjust to advancements in technology utilized in
the consumption of copyrighted works, creating opportunity for firms to capitalize on outdated
regulations.”).
263. See Rhian Jones, It Should Be Standard for Songwriters to Get a Share of Master Rights,
MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/it-should-bestandard-for-songwriters-to-get-a-share-of-master-rights/; see also How Does a Producer Get Paid,
MUSIC CONTRACTS [hereinafter MUSIC CONTRACTS], https://www.musiccontracts.com/
blog/2018/4/23/first-steps-to-setting-up-a-label-sjk55 (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (noting that music
producers, unlike songwriters, can be paid both in sound recording royalties and musical work
royalties).
Aside from [mechanical royalties] and his or her fee, the producer, like the artist, will
receive a [sound] record[ing] royalty. . . . How does this work? If the recording agreement
says the [recording] artist is to receive a [sound recording] royalty of 15%[,] . . . the artist
actually will get only . . . 12%, or ‘twelve points[,]’ . . . [and] three points [are] paid to the
producer . . . . [The three points] will be taken out of the artist’s 15 royalty points.
Id.
264. See Karl Fowlkes, The Basics: How Do Songwriters and Producers Get Paid?, MEDIUM (Feb.
13, 2019), https://medium.com/the-courtroom/the-basics-how-do-songwriters-and-producers-getpaid-5d5debef25c7?; see also MUSIC CONTRACTS, supra note 263.
265. See MUSIC CONTRACTS, supra note 263.
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recording royalties.266 If Songwriters gain a share of sound recording
royalties, this too will assuage their compensation problems without
increasing Interactives’ operating expenses.267
V. CONCLUSION
Today, streaming is the prevailing mode of music consumption.268 Yet,
Interactives are struggling to turn a profit.269 Additionally, in the streaming
era, where Interactives’ mechanical royalty payments are among Songwriters’
largest sources of income, Songwriters too are facing financial challenges.270
All the while, record labels are collecting the majority of streaming revenue
and seeing record profits.271
The MMA attempted to address Songwriters’ and Interactives’ problems
by requiring the CRB to apply a willing buyer/willing seller standard in its
mechanical rate determinations.272
The objective of this new standard is to establish reasonable, marketbased mechanical rates that “balance the interests of [Songwriters] and
[Interactives].”273 Thus, a proper application necessitates considering both
Songwriters’ and Interactives’ financial concerns.274 During the CRB’s 2018–
2022 mechanical rate determinations, the CRB acknowledged both parties’
interests.275 However, because the majority believed that the Interactives’
unprofitability would persist under current legislative conditions, the majority
disregarded Interactives’ financial interests to determine the 44% mechanical
rate increase.276
Additionally, the majority proposed even further
266. See Jones, supra note 263 (“[M]ost songwriters don’t have [sound recording] points or share.
We are fighting for people to be able to get that because it’s not standard and I think it should be.
[Sound recordings] are really the only way you make money in streaming.”).
267. See supra Part IV.A (describing Spotify’s operating expenses: music licensing and R&D).
268. LaFrance, supra note 16, at 311.
269. See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text.
270. See generally Statement of Songwriters Vol. 1, supra note 168.
271. See Nusca, supra note 141; see also Kafka & Molla, supra note 148.
272. See Music Modernization Act, 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2018).
273. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1955.
274. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing the CRB’s application of the “willing buyer/willing seller
standard,” which entailed considering the parties’ financial concerns).
275. See generally supra Part IV.C (summarizing the CRB’s 2018–2022 mechanical rate
proceedings).
276. See 2018–2022 Rate Determinations, supra note 101, at 1944 n.107 (recognizing that “an
increase in the rates might affect different interactive streaming services in different ways” and result
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consolidation of the music industry in order for Interactives to sustain the
mechanical rate increase.277 Thus, Spotify’s appeal is not predicated on greed,
but on legitimate concerns regarding the sustainability of its business and the
CRB’s proceedings.278
However, adjusting the mechanical rate is not a practical solution to
Spotify’s and Songwriters’ problems because, while Spotify cannot afford to
increase its licensing expenses, Songwriters deserve more pay for their
work.279 Only legislative reform will solve the cause of both parties’ financial
problems—a copyright system that disproportionately benefits record labels
and inadequately compensates Songwriters.280

Mariana L. Orbay

in further concentration of the industry); see also id. at 1960.
277. Id. at 1960.
278. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing the CRB’s 2018–2022 rate proceedings and Spotify’s appeal
in light of the CRB’s final rate determinations).
279. See supra Parts IV.A–B (summarizing Spotify’s and Songwriters’ financial challenges).
280. See Parts II–IV.B (analyzing the evolution of modern music copyright law and its impact on
Songwriters and Interactives today).
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